Voting on Quantities (taxes), Voting technique. ----------------------------------------------- Voting a number out of a range/spectrum carries a risk that many people will make their vote strategic: ''I expect many people will vote more then I will, therefore I will vote much lower then I really want to pull the end result into my direction.'' Example: How high should taxation be per month ? Some people may be satisfied with 100,- a month, knowing from debate in society that many people prefer between 200,- and 300,-. They then end up voting 1,- a month, hoping that the final result will be computed as the average. It may work to ask this question as a series of questions: a) Do you prefer more or less then 1,- a month ? Anwser: [MORE] | [LESS] b) Do you prefer more or less then 10,- a month ? Anwser: [MORE] | [LESS] c) Do you prefer more or less then 50,- a month ? Anwser: [MORE] | [LESS] d) Do you prefer more or less then 100,- a month ? Anwser: [MORE] | [LESS] e) Do you prefer more or less then 150,- a month ? Anwser: [MORE] | [LESS] f) Do you prefer more or less then 200,- a month ? Anwser: [MORE] | [LESS] g) Do you prefer more or less then 250,- a month ? Anwser: [MORE] | [LESS] h) Do you prefer more or less then 300,- a month ? Anwser: [MORE] | [LESS] i) Do you prefer more or less then 350,- a month ? Anwser: [MORE] | [LESS] j) Do you prefer more or less then 400,- a month ? Anwser: [MORE] | [LESS] k) Do you prefer more or less then 450,- a month ? Anwser: [MORE] | [LESS] l) Do you prefer more or less then 500,- a month ? Anwser: [MORE] | [LESS] m) Do you prefer more or less then 600,- a month ? Anwser: [MORE] | [LESS] n) Do you prefer more or less then 700,- a month ? Anwser: [MORE] | [LESS] Some people who genuinly want infinite taxes will vote [MORE] on each question. Some people who want zero taxes will vote [LESS] everywhere. If the result is computed by choosing that level of taxation where the [MORE] and [LESS] votes where most equal, it may be harder to manipulate. People could vote [MORE] on question h) to l) even though they really want taxes at 280,-, but that increases the chance their vote will get lost in the minority high votes, and that their vote force downward from 350,- which they think is too high doesn't work there, but pulls it upwards still. Say someone trying to vote strategically expects most people to vote 50,-, but he/she prefers taxes at 280,-. Then voting 700,- will have little effect. The strategic vote may actually go to the 100,- vote, because he/she calculates: "if most people will vote 50,-, then the 100,- will also attract many votes, if I add my vote-balance to 100,- to 150,- [MORE] and 150,- [LESS], I run a higher chance that my vote will combine with all the people who are just a little above the 100,- mark, this may produce us our victory of the 100,- to 150,- range over the 50,- to 100,- range. I could vote 700,- to pull the result up, but the people who balance their vote on the 700,- to more range will probably not be the range that attracts most votes, thus in the result it will only get ignored. Then there is the uncertainty: will people really mostly prefer that 50,- to 100,- range ? Am I not deluded ? Maybe I should just vote [MORE] on everything up to 250,- and [LESS] on everything from 300,- and higher, like I honestly prefer. Who knows, maybe most people think like that, then our range might win after all. This is giving voters a limited number of choices out of a range, and then choosing only that one with most votes: Do you want: a) Do you prefer 1,- a month ? b) Do you prefer 10,- a month ? c) Do you prefer 50,- a month ? d) Do you prefer 100,- a month ? e) Do you prefer 150,- a month ? f) Do you prefer 200,- a month ? g) Do you prefer 250,- a month ? h) Do you prefer 300,- a month ? i) Do you prefer 350,- a month ? j) Do you prefer 400,- a month ? k) Do you prefer 450,- a month ? l) Do you prefer 500,- a month ? m) Do you prefer 600,- a month ? n) Do you prefer 700,- a month ? Give your letter of choice: .... If the spectrum presented honestly encompasses the will of most people and goes from absurdly little to absurdly much, then maybe it can help reduce possibilities of strategic-vote-manipulation. Voting n), and if then that option n) actually wins, you'd end up with 700,- in taxes ! If that's not what you wanted, that was a pretty dumb vote then. If 700,- does not win but you voted n) "to pull the result up" in a pretence-vote while you really would vote h), you just *wasted* your entire chance to pull the chance upwards that h) would actually win. Maybe just by one vote miss the option c) won, so that too was a dumb vote then, wasting your vote with strategic games. The key is to *ignore completely* all non-winning ranges. If computations are done to compute some kind of average between ranges, strategic voting could come back. This method could be refined by having a second vote between the two (or more) winning options. For example the result may be: a b c d e f g h i j k l m n 7% 6% 9% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 8% Which makes c) the winner. However even though it's supposed to get ignored, 78% ended up voting "more taxes then c)". Where the votes for f) really strategic ? Why didn't they vote for n) then. This would be more conclusive: a b c d e f g h i j k l m n 1% 1% 87% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% Further voting could continue, but if you take the two winners c) and n): is that an honest choice given that most people did vote for 'much more then c) and much less then n)', and that n) may also have garnered the extreme/strategic vote and only represents 8% ? Will the choice 'either c) or n)' produce a result close to the 'average will of all people' ? Probably not. Another problematic result: a b c d e f g h i j k l m n 9% 6% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 5% 7% Obviously some loonies tried to collapse the Government with an absurd low taxation vote, but they only represent 9%, 91% wants to pay sufficient taxes to have a nation. But now it's let's destroy the nation for that 9% ? It would all be solved if people didn't vote strategically, but experience with multi-party democracy shows that they do so, probably by large majority. They all think they can beat the system, while they achieve nothing but beating themselves. To be honest I haven't yet found a way to deal with these strategic vote manipulations. The best solution seems to be that people simply try to vote their real honest vote, which is what the democratic systems are designed for. Number-voting on ranges / pre-choices (which also carries a higher risk of question-manipulation), could perhaps be conducted without a result coming out of it with mathematical precision. For example you could say: if the result looks relatively sane, like so: For example the result may be: a b c d e f g h i j k l m n 7% 3% 25% 13% 19% 11% 8% 2% 1% 1% 0% 2% 1% 7% then: 'result was moderately sane, thus rule "biggest won" is in effect, c) won.' You could then also have a second vote: Do you want: c) Do you prefer 50,- a month ? d) Do you prefer 100,- a month ? e) Do you prefer 150,- a month ? Give your letter of choice: .... ... under the rule 'biggest wins.' But if the result looks troubled like previously: a b c d e f g h i j k l m n 7% 6% 9% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 8% Or: a b c d e f g h i j k l m n 9% 6% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 5% 7% Then maybe you could throw out the result completely, and react with a question simplification, seeing that the entire range is supported: Do you want: f) Do you prefer 200,- a month ? g) Do you prefer 250,- a month ? h) Do you prefer 300,- a month ? i) Do you prefer 350,- a month ? Give your letter of choice: .... If that then yields a 'sane' result (seems to have captured some balance of will in the winner): f g h i 7% 30% 55% 15% ... then h) could be winner. If that yields an unbalanced result: f g h i 90% 0% 3% 7% ... then clearly the will of the people is f) or less. ... Which could lead to another vote: Do you want: d) Do you prefer 100,- a month ? e) Do you prefer 150,- a month ? f) Do you prefer 200,- a month ? g) Do you prefer 250,- a month ? Give your letter of choice: .... ... and so on, until hopefully a 'sane' result is obtained. Probably, along the line of all these votes, it become more and more clear what the people want, even if the results may be somewhat strange. It is still a vote by the people, even if it appears thoroughly 'insane,' it can say a lot. If for example the result is: a b c d e f g h i j k l m n 50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 5% 45% ... then it is an indication of some sort of trouble, isn't it. 50% seems to want to end the nation, while 45% seems to want crushing taxation and who knows, maybe that too mean they want to end the nation ? All in all it may be best to make 'winner takes all' the rule in number range voting, 'provided the result is ""sane""'. If the result is not ""sane,"" then perhaps the best protocol is to make up a new question until a 'sane' result can be obtained. Note that it is probably possible to always get a 'sane' result on the first go by making the question rough/strange enough: Do you want: a) Do you prefer 0,1,- a month ? b) Do you prefer 0,2,- a month ? e) Do you prefer 150,- a month ? m) Do you prefer 600,- a month ? n) Do you prefer 700,- a month ? Give your letter of choice: .... ``WINNER TAKES ALL, if result is "sane".'' Most likely results in something like: a b e m n 15% 3% 64% 3% 15% The 'extremists' go for a) and n) thus they aren't really that 'sane' to begin with, which is proven by b) and m) not attracting much. Then everyone who is moderately reasonable will vote e), provided most don't want to end the nation, and are willing to pay taxation (Government is not a gang of criminals but providing useful services people want to pay for). It is, I guess, likely that people will vote for a far too low taxation rate, for which they will possibly pay a very heavy price in a Government that is unable to pay for basic services. The people may ask for impossible levels of Government services, but do not put up the funds needed for it wanting to sit front-row for next to nothing (in true 'bargain for maximum result' style). I suppose that the Government (delegates), being on the other side to a degree on the taxation amount issue, could decide to say something like: "FINE, THE PEOPLE RULE AND WE WILL DO YOUR WILL AS DELEGATES, BUT IF WE DO NOT GET THE MONEY WE NEED, WE QUIT OUR JOBS ! IF YOU ASK THE IMPOSSIBLE, WE CAN NOT FOLLOW YOUR WILL AND THEREFORE MUST RESIGN." At the point where most/many/all delegates simply quit the Government, and if nobody is able/willing to "do the impossible," the people may quickly come to their senses and put out more taxation money. On the other hand, if a new group of delegates can do the job much more cheaply, then the people also have won. In any case: the will of the people must be followed. If the people want to destroy the nation through near zero taxation, that must be done. No better way to learn the value of taxation then to watch what happens when paying nothing at all (which may collapse a criminal Government, hence 'no taxation' is not really an insane demand, it can be perfectly sane to withhold any and all taxes, to vote for zero taxes.)