Recource competition -------------------- The hunting resource is a resource that many people may like to have. Many people may only be wanting a fraction of the equal value of a hunting right. If an equal share of resources of the nation is 1 acres of farmland, the equivalent economic value of a hunting right could be to kill 50 deer per year, while many/most/all people wishing a hunting right may only desire to kill between 2 and 5 animals a year. To give one person the full right and have him/her lend that out is cumbersome for everyone. The proposed constitution says: _9.1.a Structure of Resources Every person has the natural and practical right to use its equal share of the available natural resources. _9.1.a-4 Resources, usage The Government can establish a percentage and/or specific parts as resource which can only be handled, or left untouched, in a way determined by the government. _9.1.a-6 Resources, rent Natural resources up to the total a person has a natural right to, is awarded for free. Whatever the persons wants to have that is still available in the resource bank, is awarded. This does seem to leave some room. The biggest obstacle is the last sentence of 9.1.a-6, because it says that a person can take what it wants. The reason for that sentence is that the Government cannot play favorites, to take control away from the Government over that important 'power over people' aspect of it (leaving only a more abstract quality control aspect). Once the representative can play favorites with reource awarding it opens an avenue of clique formation & injustice (corruption). 9.1.a was written with 'equal share' meaning equal share of the whole in whatever form it may be. But one could attempt to re-interpret this to mean: 'equal share of the contested resource' too ? In that case the problem is solved by cutting up a highly contested resource below its equal economic value, and only awarding all the contestants for it a fractional share of it. This would not allow the Government to play favorites - to the contrary - and therefore would at least satisfy the intend of 9.1.a-6. But if someone where to sue the Government for, say, the full equal value of a hunting right of 50 animals a year and it was actually available in the resource bank, then it seems that person has a very good case that they should win (doesn't it ?). Maybe this is not a problem because if a resource is hotly coveted by many, then one may presume that they are willing to register their wish with the Government for whenever that resource becomes available. Fortunately the Constitution doesn't say 'first come, first served,' but it says 'whatever is available.' But what if something is not yet available ? The Constitution doesn't say that once a specific resource becomes available, that it then has to go to the person who has waited on it for the longest (even though that seems logical to assume and do). I suppose this opens up the possibility of saying: once a resource becomes available, then 'we' (the way things get done) take a look at all who want it. If there is a large contingent of people waiting for it, they can all be taken to be: 'persons who want what is available.' I suppose that it is equally logical to say: let's share, let's cut it up between the waiting persons. That way you'd also conform to 9.1.a 'equal share.' Obviously persons who get a 5 animals a year hunting right still have 90% of their natural resource rights open for something else (if a full economic-value share was 50 animals). I guess that solves it, doesn't it. People who want contested resources would register their wish somewhere (they ask for what they want, and if it is not available their request can be noted or marked as a standing request for once it becomes available if the applicant indicates this). First time, when all resources get distributed, the hunting right gets shared up between all the applicants. In a worst case scenario the hunting right gets atomized extremely, like 1 animal per 3 years or so. But that's then just bad luck, because who is anyone to deny another. Such an atomized right then only trickles back into the rouserce bank at 1 animal per 3 years, and concequently the hunting right that is freed only reaches the resource bank at such a slow rate. If there is nobody waiting then it would slowly add itself up. If there are many people still waiting it could get fractioned further. If there is 3000 persons who all got a tiny hunting right and all still register for more, then that 1 animal per 3 years would become 1 animal per 9000 years for each of these 3000 perons. One could rightly question: isn't that a little bit crazy. Fractioning it up may be a solution, but one animal per 9000 years is absurd, it is impossible to police, and people would for sure all shoot that animal in the first century of those 9000 years, causing in practice for the limit to be overstepped greatly. If you mark each right with a concequtive year that the hunt can happen, a person has no use for a right to hunt an animal centuries into the future. Hence one would have to conclude at some point that a resource has been atomized. Say one animal per 10 years is the stretch, going much after that and people would seriously start to wonder whether they are still alive once their hunting year comes around (say you mark the year on a permit or register). With the hunting right atomized (through reasoning / decision), the problem of who to award it to comes back if there are fewer atoms in the bank then applicants for more hunting rights. I suppose one would want to choose a solution that does not allow the Government to start playing favorites, so some kind of general rule that always works. Two options seem obvious: the right is awarded to the oldest people in the waiting line first - because they have least change in the rest of their lives to enjoy the right and everyone gets older anyway so their precedence goes up, and the other is who have waited longest in the line for it. * One of the dangers of the system is that some people want to speculate: they want to gain access to contested resources, and then trade that right to others (ask the resource bank to swap the right holder names). I'm not sure how big a danger this is, considdering that each person can only hold 1 equal share. There is not much capacity in each person to speculate with. On the upside: if there is some of this, then persons who want to pay for a certain resource could get hold of it for money. If this doesn't become a major infestation with speculators pressing out ordinary people and then selling them what they where entitled to already, but if it is only marginal (around 1% say), then maybe it can give the system that dimension too, so that people feel a little less like they are waiting hopelessly because there is a second chance / way (provided they are willing to pay). I suppose that speculation can become a problem with the hotly contested resources, because people who already have what they want - say 5 animals per year - will simply stay on the list for more. When more comes around they only want to sell it away. They would then profit from what should have been awarded for free. They could also rent out what another would have gotten for nothing otherwise. In a sense that is just how the system works (you get your share, you can rent it out or even swap it with another for money if the bureaucratic laws made allow for that). To combat this what amounts to something of an unfair business, you could also award the hunting rights to those who have least of them. However that doesn't solve it in principle, because people who have no hunting rights may also attempt to get in on the speculation game. They get rights, swap/sell them away, have nothing and then get priority. That doesn't work then. If you start to look at 'who are the real hunters,' the right might land with whom most honestly deserve and want it (for free). On the other hand you're opening up the system for the Government to start to play favorites with the resources, which is a dangerous principle (Government already has so much power). As a way to defeat (excessive) speculation it could work though. Speculation is depending on the prices people want to pay, if few people where willing to buy a swap/sale hunting resource the price for it would get cheaper, until the speculator gives up on the game. The same is true for rent: if nobody wants to rent a right, but they wait until they get their right, then speculative rent of contested resources also stops (people who don't genuinly want a contested right, only go for the contested right because it is contested and then attempt to profit from rent, but in a way that too is how the system works and as such not an abuse of power; still it isn't really too nice considdering that people who really want to use that right don't get it for (care) free and nothing right away). Speculation with swap/sale (if allowed) and rent (constitutionally protected business) might therefore be best combatted with discipline in those waiting on the rights. If they can keep it together and not buy/rent the hotly contested resources, more resources get available to them for nothing once speculation disintegrates for lack of profit. Another issue that could come up is: people who enter the list with 100 friends, so that 99 of them award their hunting atoms to their friend. In a way that too is their right, it is certainly a way to 'cast a vote' isn't it, and as such one would wonder if it is a bad practice of favoratism, or a beneficial one. I suppose people would do good to realize that the system isn't designed - nor could it be - to give everone whatever they wanted. It is designed to give each an equal economic power, in the abstract. Be that a hunting right or crop growing right, etc, the point is that you would get something near an equal share for nothing one way or the other, but it isn't said you could get exactly what you'd hope for. Presumably almost nobody would get /exactly/ what they'd hope for, although through swapping around and oiling the swaps with some money could for example cause many people to have soil near their homes instead of far away (etc). I suppose that for money one could get access to a lot of things one would want (I don't mean bribing the bureaucrats, which is the increased danger if you allow rules that make Government decide who gets what by some lever they control somehow, say for example an exam that they could make you succeed or fail at, etc), but by renting or swap/buying. If one is willing to work to get the money, one may eventually be able to offer someone a price they won't refuse. Want it -> work for it, maybe you can get lucky. Over time the system should get perfected.