The total cost of the system is: cost of maintenance and wages of fund managers + cost of the investment capital and loan defaults + potential overhead from legal or illegal manipulations by Capitalist authorities, the for profit finance establishment and for profit investors. The first two costs are unavoidable, the second probably ends when the law of a Nation is set right.
From this one can see this is a real productive business, where one pays for a service, unlike giving money to a bank or for profit investment fund, where one would "miraculously" get payed on top of getting a service. There is no miracle with for profit finance though: the money is taken from the productive people, from their wages, from your wage; you pay through bad labor conditions and low wages (unless you are in the boss/investor category yourself).
The fund can deliver two kinds of loans: consumption credit to individuals including mortgages (if the fund size allows it), and business upstart or business expansion project credit. The business upstart credit should be given to people who are unlikely or who promise not to abuse their workers with unfair wages compared to company profit, that is not a major difference in income between owner/boss and workers. In this the fund would act in an opposite way to for profit finance, which is the goal.
It does not matter in principle whether loans are given with or without interest. If they are with interest, the additional income goes to the capital fund, putting the cost on maintenance of the fund on the lenders and not the participants. Since the profit does not go to the managers, no profit motive occurs. An indirect profit motive may occur from the side of the participants though, with the negative effects of stimulating abusive bosses. This may however be off set by the knowledge that lower costs on the credit system through high interest loans comes back to haunt the participants in their professional lives as low wages and bad labor conditions. When loans are without interest, or only inflation correction interest, the capital account will need to be replenished more often with funds from the participants. In general it may be a easiest to decide one interest rate a for all loans, and never deviate from that rate: keeps it simple.
Loans could be made to the participants in the fund only, or to everyone. If made to everyone, the persons who take the loan should take the cost of the maintenance of the system proportional to their loan: they would then pay for the service and the general cost of loan defaults (default means loan is not payed back) proportional to the risk (size of the loan compared to generally associated default cost) and effort involved. Participants would already be meeting these costs when taking a loan from the fund.
For people who never take out a credit loan, the system can still be of use, because they may come to work in businesses that were funded with non-profit service cost finance, which protects the living standard and working conditions of just about everyone who is not in the financial for profit establishment, or the boss structures it maintains in the economy. In an economy that has sound laws, disallowing for profit finance, the cost of this non-profit finance would come back as taxation. It is therefore a to be expected cost of life in a technical society. Someone has to pay for minimally needed services, just as someone has to pay for roads and water lines. However once for profit finance is gone from a Nation, the total cost of the credit system is likely to drop because it will not be fought against in all manner of ways by for profit finance.
For additional positive economic effect, it could be agreed that a business invested in by non-profit finance goes into the hands of the workers once the original owner/boss goes away. The original boss/owner will receive compensation from future profit, for instance as if still an employee without actually working at all. Since this is not feasible with very small businesses, the cut off point could for instance be: if there are 1 owner plus 9 or more employees, it goes to the employees, if less the owner can do what it wants.
To keep the integrity of the fund high, it may be a good idea not even to accept people as participants or lenders who own shares and stock or who are associated with money gambling in the productive economy, who have banking capital and the like, because these can be mechanisms to infiltrate and take over the fund. That kind of money is contrary to the way it is supposed to work, it brings in people with wrong ideas who may only be looking to take the fund over and make it a failure somehow. One would also need to be careful if such a fund is set up, that it is legitimate, and not a scam set up by for profit investment interests, who are looking to discredit the idea by setting it up and then mismanaging it. A form of democratic control by participants over the managers is therefore needed: to defeat infiltration and mismanagement.
Since it's all so close, a little sophistry may be useful: "this isn't selling `money,' but selling a `service that sells money.'" Technically that is correct, since the fee to the service account is for a general service being provided to anyone, the contributions to the capital account are to provide the system with the tools it needs. This results in a "service that can be delivered," not unlike insurance. If there's interest on loans then that is not "profit" (as in price difference resulting in profit in a sale), but rather repair for incurred damages on the size of the capital account from loan defaults, like paying ahead of time for damages to a rental car business.
This line would be crossed when a loan is given and somehow its proceeds or excess ends up as profit for a fund manager. This type of fraud could happen if a fund manager (in breach of the system) demands an excessive payment to the service account to make a loan, or if the system is directly broken by moving funds from the capital fund directly to the fund manager's income (service account), or deceptive schemes making loans to friends that then default, and the like (a "for profit" activity at least, though more like a common crime). Such practices would put a profit motive on the fund managers on where to place the money, breaking the system (turning it into a form of fraud, probably hidden from sight for the participants).
To prevent problems like this requires adequate oversight. It could help if there are objective rules for when a person can get how high a loan, and to make loan agreements public knowledge. It may also help to separate the consumption credit and business start/expansion credit loans: to make the system for business loans more difficult, have more of a say from the participants in whether to agree to such loans, since it can be difficult to predict the risk, the risk is likely high, and there can be long term consequences (positive and negative) from such an investment (growing up a good or bad business).
Undermining the profit motive when dealing with money itself can be or is complicated, because naturally/usually everyone likes to have money.
Assets: +- 5.000 acres farmland, 2.320 acres woodland, 2 offices
Staff: 15
Monthly participation due: 1% of income + 1/60th average income
Capital participation due: variable (percentage of income) *)
Power structure: direct, participatory and representative democracy
Web: www.SanityFund-HoChiMinh.vn
*) Usually not more then monthly participation, never more then 1/30th median income; very low incomes do not have to pay the capital due.
Date: | Approved: | Recipient: | Sum/Cost: | Comments: | Risk: +++/--- | Member Since |
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22-Jan-2008 | Kim A. | Chiang C. (AgriDo) | 50.000 / 5.000 + particip. | Rice farm [start] {naddi > 90%} | +++ | 21-jan-2008 |
22-Jan-2008 | Kim A. | Doh Y. [loan < contr.] | 500 + infl.corr. | Cons.Cr. (baby) | -- | 07-jul-2006 |
... |